Old Dominion University

ODU Digital Commons
Political Science & Geography Faculty
Publications

Political Science & Geography

2-15-2020

A Partnership At Risk
Simon Serfaty
Old Dominion University, sserfaty@odu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/politicalscience_geography_pubs
Part of the International Relations Commons

Original Publication Citation
Serfaty, S. (2020). A partnership at risk. National Interest(166), 21-33. Retrieved from
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/partnership-risk-123291.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science & Geography at ODU Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science & Geography Faculty Publications by an
authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@odu.edu.

Risk
A
Partnership At
A t Risk
A Partnership
By Simon
Serfaty
Simon Serfaty
By
policy.
Trump, Brexit
Donald Trump,
policy. Even absent Donald
transatlantic
t is no secret that
that the transatlantic
EU
gone , the eu
Putin gone,
Vladimir Putin
seeded, and Vladimir
partnership is at risk.
Admittedly, this settled,
risk. Admittedly,
institutional piland NATO
nato , the two main institutional
pil
condition
neither new nor
condition may seem neither
partnership, would
transatlantic partnership,
unusual. Ever since the United
United States lars of the transatlantic
face a consequential
Rusa leadership
West,
consequential agenda: engaging Rus
of the of
on behalf
assumed,
on behalf
the West,
a leadership
assumed,
reMiddle East, re
sia, managing
managing the Greater Middle
way-one
old-fashioned way—
it had earned the old-fashioned
one
sponding
partcontrolling the spread
China, controlling
war at a time—
European part
main European
sponding to China,
time-its its main
ending the wars of
weapons, ending
nuclear weapons,
method s, of nuclear
ners have questioned
questioned its goals, methods,
commercial
rul es-based commercial
9/11,
sustaining a rules-based
9/11 , sustaining
and even its values. Similarly,
Similarly, ever since
order,
climate
urgency of climate
addressing the urgency
order, addressing
their
the states of postwar
Europe began their
postwar Europe
growing
impact of a growing
change,
sharing the impact
change, sharing
mutation
eu ), their
Union ((Eu),
European Union
mutation into a European
migrant
anarregulating the cyber anar
migrant crisis, regulating
ultimate
methods, and even
ultimate goals, singular methods,
chy, digging
massive imbalanc
imbalances,
es,
out of massive
some of their
digging out
value s have been cause for
their values
and more. These highly complex
issues are
comp lex issues
concern or occasional hostility, not just am
amposcpost-war , post
bivalence,
knowns of the post-war,
known knowns
presi- the known
States-one presi
United States—one
bivalence, in the United
secular,
and
post-national
agendas
of
the
th e
agendas
al
dent
and
one
issue
at
a
time.
post-nation
dent
decade
ahead.
For
many
of
these
issues,
m any
Yet,
decade ahead.
United States and the
both the United
Yet, for both
tim e. This
running out of time.
states of Europe, the crisis is different
chis the long term is running
different this
is a time for more unity,
less-if if not
unity , not less—
time—
certainly critical, difficult to contain,
contain,
time-certainly
now, when? As Angela Merkel
Merkel poignantly
poignantly
and possibly existential.
existential.
reminded
Harvard’s
new
graduates
in May
's
The difference can be explained in many
Harvard
reminded
y
man
2019,
''Anything that seems set in stone or
2019 , “Anything
comways.
ways. For one, the crisis is unusually com
inalterable can indeed change,”
whether for
change," whether
plete, as it combines
overcombines a full range of over
better
worse.
lapping
better or for worse.
political
economic, and political
strategic, economic,
lapping strategic,
In short,
Atlantic,
both sides of the Atlantic,
short , on both
well
issues
NATO as well
EU and nato
issues that involve the eu
this is an hour
That
maximum danger. That
hour of maximum
as each of their thirty-five members. These
is what this moment
about-a a shared
issues transcend
moment is all about—
their
personalities of their
transcend the personalities
irremight turn into an era of irre
state's risk that it might
leaders or the specificities of any one state’s
s.
versible ruptures.
rupture
Simon Serfaty is Professor of U.S. Foreign
singular
ension ooff the m
o
modimension
Policy at Old Dominion
odu ),
singular dim
Dominion University ((oou),
ment is also the fact that a principal
in Norfolk,
Zbigniew
He also holds the Zbigniew
VA.. Fie
Norfolk, va
U-turn is
history'ss U-turn
Global
Brzezinski
hair
Western driver of history’
(emeritus) in Global
ir (emeritus)
Cha
Brzezinski C
the president
facUn ited States, now fac
Security
president of the United
Center
with the Center
Geostrategy with
Security and Geostrategy
re-election.
(cs1s), ing a protracted
campaign for re-election.
Studies (csis),
for Strategic & International
protract ed campaign
International Studies
A short
in Washington,
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his blind date with our
shore year before his
oc.
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future, the only outcome
outcome known for sure is
that
that the election will be pivotal-arguably
pivotal— arguably
than in 1948 with
no less than
with Truman’s
Truman's un
unexpected
victory or in 1980 with Carter's
expected victory
Carter’s
expected defeat. It's
It’s the voters, stupid: since
1992, the election has been won against the
pundits'
prevaiiling
pundits’ logical favorite and the prevailing
Clinton over Bush H.W
H.W.
poll du jour: Bill Clinton
Bush, George W
W. Bush over Al
A1 Gore, Barack
Obama
Obama over Hillary Clinton
Clinton (for the DemDem
ocratic
ocratic nomination),
nomination), and Donald
Donald Trump
Trump
over Clinton.
Clinton.
But, even while awaiting the people's
people’s final
verdict, this is not the moment
moment for a time
out. During this electoral
year, it will be the
electoral year,
allies'
to lead from behind.
behind. Doing
allies’ turn
turn to
Doing so
principles.
will require adhering to three basic principles.
First, don't
don 't provoke.
don’t indulge
indulge but
but don’t
provoke.
The
world is
The Trump
Trump narrative
narrative about
about the world

fourdimensio nal: The
The world
advanfour-dimensional:
world took
took advan
tage— enough! The
The elite misled-down!
misled— down!
tage-enough!
The
out! Take America
The Deep State rules—
rules-out!
America
back-first
primitive the
back— first again! However
However primitive
narrative
not
narrative may be, it sells well-and
well— and not
only in the
ited States, where it seems
the Un
United
to
better when
openly confron
confronto work
work even better
when openly
tational
personal. Make no
l:
ational and explicitly personal.
mistake: expect
expect no growth
growth from Trump
Trump
mistake:
2020, only regression. As he makes for
in 2020,
forpolicy the continuation
electoral
eign policy
continuation of electoral
po
litics by other
politics
other means,
means, no one can tell
what looms
tariff war with
what
looms ahead:
ahead: more
more tariff
with
China,
Europe and others
others
China, but
but also with
with Europe
perhaps;
with
perhaps; a flawed
flawed deal w
ith the like of
North
with the like of
N orth Korea; a real war with
Iran; or whatever
whatever else might
might seem politipoliti
cally expedient,
expedient, however
however strategically
strategically inco
incoherent
dangerous.
herent or dangerous.
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In such a period, it will be best for the

pivot,, or just bench
pivot
bench player—
player-butbut however
Europe
quite effective:
sta tes of Europe
Europe plays it, it can be quite
states
Europe to
to avoid confrontation:
confrontation:
"deconflictionary " when
matters threaten
threaten
don't
don't provoke a U.S. pres
pres- “deconflictionary”
don’t indulge but don’t
when matters
"representational "
ident who finds in any slight an offense,
offense, any to
to get out of hand,
hand, and “representational”
when America's
America’s absence threatens
threatens to leave
offense a provocation
provocation,, and any provocation
the West out. Remember the Anglo-French
an opportunity
opp ortunit y for a provocative
provoc ative rebuke.
T hus, after Brexit, the best way to
role in Georgia in the fall of 2008, or the
to respond
Thus,
U.S.-Iranian
's anti-EU
anti-Eu strategy is to
self- EU
Three’s role to launch U.S.-Iranian
eu Big Three's
to Trump
Trump’s
to let it selfdestruct
failed deal and disruptive
negotiations a few years later and, more rere
destruct,, one failed
disruptive
improbable promise
cently, the French attempt
cently,
attempt to re-start a diadia
tweet at a time
time.. The
The improbable
logue with Iran pending
later.
of a bilateral trade agreement
pending broader talks later.
agreement with Britain
to find
pre Going
on the quick is one example, with its preGoing short and thinking
thinking small is to
dictably disappointing
way—one issue at a time, one
disappointing,, and even humiliathumiliat and share a way-one
th e likely congressional step at a time, during
during a year of great geopogeopo
ing, one-way terms, the
stall prior to a hypothetical ratification, and litical turbulence-towards
turbulence— towards a compromise.
Third, step up and dig out. No stratestrate
tweeted afterthoughts.
afterthoughts. Trump
's
even the tweeted
Trump’s
Third,
gic
black
hole
deeper,
wider,
is
self-serving
inconsistency
on
self-serving inconsistenc y on
Make
Make no
no mistake:
mistake: and darker
the way to
to a deal does not end
Middle
darker than the Middle
East. As the subtle geopolitigeopoliti
East.
after the deal has been signed,
expect no growth
growth
thinker and baseball-great
which is why signing once the
rr.
,1> · 20110 cal thinker
.
al
h from
om Trump
.1rumr in 2020,
~ ,
Yogi Berra would
ttalking
alking en
1s not always
ways tthee
Yogi
would have said,
ends
d s is
only regression.
regression. As he the region is now half
best option.
half about
about
the
Arab-Israeli
conflict,
half
Arab-Israeli
conflict,
half
Second,
th
in
k
small
and
Second, think small
makes
makesforeign
foreign policy
policy
about
about Arab-Arab
Arab-Arab conflicts,
conflicts,
hether Trum
go short.
short. W
Whether
Trumpp
continuation ooff and the remaining
mastered "the
remaining half
half about
ever really mastered
“the art the continuation
of
argued
great
power
con
o f the deal
deal”" can be argued
great
and
small
power
conelectoral
electoralpolitics
politics by
by
flicts. That
T hat leaves plenty
one
bankruptcy at a time.
flicts.
plenty of
one bankruptcy
time.
But however
that argument
however that
argument other means, no one room for everyone to meddle
harm .
goes, what
what was mastered,
mastered, if can tell
tell what
what looms and do harm.
an ything , is the "big
preced
anything,
“big”" deal.
For many years, and precedahead.
Ignor
ed are the small de
als
ing Trump
to a twoTrump,, the road to
Ignored
deals
which diplomac
requires for a balanced
state solution
solution has been closed for major
major
diplomacyy requires
balanced
and durable
agreement. For there, in the
repair amidst
growing doubts
doubts about
.S.
durable agreement.
amidst growing
about U
U.S.
reliability as an honest
honest broker. The resultresult
realm ooff les grand
es ajfaires,
grandes
affaires, the pursuit
pursuit
of an everything-for-everything,
ing vacuum
vacuum surprisingly
surprisingly restore
restoress Europe’s
everything-for-everything, now-ornow-orEurope's
never deal is a non-starter-as
rampart against
non-starter— as shown with
position as a main Western rampart
thee lack of
o f progre
progress
pursuing North
N orth
th
ss in pursuing
the unwanted
unwanted ascendancy of self-styled susu
Korea's
zation , or Iran
's nonKorea’s denucleari
denuclearization,
Iran’s
non perpowers
perpowers like Russia, the destructive
destructive inin
nuclearization, "the
“the best deal of the cencen competence
nuclearization,
competence of regional bullies like Saudi
tur
y" in the Middle
revo
Arabia, the dangerous provocations of revotury”
Middle East, and so forth.
And yet, even while some of these crises
lutionar y powers like Iran, and even, of late,
crises lutionary
revi
threaten
to erupt
erupt into proverbial
proverbial "Octo“O cto the ineffective assertiveness of newly revithre
aten to
surprises,” the European allies
allies can help sionist powers like Turkey. That
ber surprises,"
That the United
States is not doing
doing well should
should not be an
stay th
se to avoid dangerous
thee cour
course
dangerous dead
less: lacklack
alibi for the states of Europe to do less:
ends while the electoral clock runs out. The
role varies-medi
ator, umpir
e, point
to assert itself as a power in the
ing the will to
varies— mediator,
umpire,
point guard,
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Middle
bring it the diplomacy
Middle East and bring
diplomacy it
has been lacking
lacking in recent
recent years, the risk
for Europe
chat regional instabilities
instabilities will
Europe is that
continue co
continue
to spill over dangerously
dangerously across the
Mediterranean.
Mediterranean.

I

n 2016,
's candidacy
2016, Trump
Trump’s
candidacy was severely
underestimated,
enabling one
underestimated, thereby
thereby enabling
of
of the
the least
least suited
suited candidates
candidates for the
U.S. presidency
presidency ever to
co defeat
defeat one of the
prepared ever.
best prepared
ever. At the present
present moment
moment
though, nearly
nearly every
every available
available indicator
indicator
though,
points to
co a one-term
points
one-term limit
limit for the Trump
Trump
presidency,
notwithstanding
a
statistically
presidency, notwithstanding statistically
robust
robust economy. Assuming
Assuming the time co
to be
half
what can be expected
half past Trump,
Trump, what
expected next?
Throughout
Cold War
and since,
Throughout the Cold
War and
since,
introduced
every U.S.
U.S. president
president has been
been introduced
in opposition
opposition to
to his predecessor.
predecessor. In most
most
cases, there was no new beginning,
beginning , however,
cases,
expected changes
changes remained
and the expected
remained shore
short
what had been announced.
announced. With
With Trump
Trump
of what
making
predecessor the anti-model
anti-model he
making his predecessor
did not
not want
become, there
there has
want to be or become,
been seemingly
chat past continuseemingly little of that
continu
ity. And
And yet, don
don’t't expect wholesale changchang
es from
from a new administration.
administration. Many
Many of
of
Trump's
Trump’s priorities
priorities are likely to
co endure
endure past
his time—
time-getting
getting tough
being
cough on China,
China , being
demanding on trade, pursuing
more demanding
pursuing nego
negotiations with
with North
tiations
North Korea, saying "no"
“no” to
to
a nuclear
nuclear Iran, seeking a deal over Ukraine
Ukraine
as part
pare of a detente
with Putin’s
Putin 's Russia, in
indetente with
cluding
cluding a new nuclear
nuclear balance aa trois
trois with
China, and so forth.
China,
Admittedly , it is premature
anticipate
Admittedly,
premature co
to anticipate
how that
chat legacy will be handled
handled specifically,
specifically,
pending
pending more clarity on Trump’
Trump 'ss successor.
Bue
not too
coo early to
But it is not
co assume that
chat a key
priority of the next U.S. administration
priority
administration will
co restore the credibility
be to
credibility of its alliance
relationships with
relationships
with a transatlantic
cransaclancic relance
relance
chat should
that
should respond
respond to
co three broad
broad strategic
guidelines.
First, tell Europe
Europe it is wanted-one
wanted— one nana
tional capital
time and
tional
capital at a time
and as a Union.
Union.

224
4

The
N ational Interest
The National
Interest

Conversely, the United
United States must
must also be
cold it is needed—
needed-notnot only for what
told
what it does
buc also for who it is. On
On both
both sides of the
but
Atlantic, in the United
and Europe,
Europe,
Atlantic,
United States and
an emotional
emotional reset is sorely needed.
Soon after the election,
election, the new president
president
should
should formally reassert America's
America’s unequivunequiv
ocal com
commitment
m itm ent to an ever closer
closer and
and
more capable Europe,
Europe, as well as a stronger
stronger
and
more cohesive
cohesive NATO.
and ever more
n a t o . There
There can
ambiguity: the EU
be no ambiguity:
e u and
and NATO
nato are very
important
interests, if for no other
other
im portant U.S.
U.S. interests,
reason that
chat they are vital
vital interests
reason
interests for its
members,
members, America's
America’s allies of choice. If not
not
Europe
Europe as a Union,
Union, how; if not
not the EU
eu with
with
NATO,
with whom?
NATO, with
chat certainty
certainty across the Atlantic
To share that
Atlantic
and
elsewhere,
president should
and elsewhere, the U.S.
U.S. president
should
make the Euro-Atlantic
Euro-Atlantic institutions
institutions in Brus
Brussels the first stop of an early trip to
co Europe,
February 2005,
as George W. Bush did in February
2005,
then the earliest such trip after a presidential
presidential
election. The
The goal would be to
co explain and
discuss how the new administration
administration intends
intends
co
to redress existing grievances and address the
agenda inherited
inherited from the past years.
More
More specifically,
specifically, and
and compatible
compatible with
with
positions adopted
the positions
adopted by most
current
most current
democratic
candidates, the new president
democratic candidates,
president
should quickly
quickly announce
should
announce his or her inten
intenco restore the pre-Trump
pre-Trump consensus on
tion to
three issues of immediate
immediate significance:
three
significance: to
to
re-embrace the 2015 Joint
Comprehensive
re-embrace
Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action
with the expectation
Action,, with
expectation of a
broader
round of multilateral
broader round
multilateral negotiations
negotiations
with Iran; a return
return to the Paris Treaty on
with
Climate
Change , with shared goals of further
Climate Change,
further
progress in many of its specific dimensions;
and to negotiate
negotiate a Transatlantic
Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Pact for completion
completion and eventual
Investment
ratification at the earliest possible date.
Second,
community of overSecond, relaunch
relaunch a community
over
lapping interests,
shared goals, and
lapping
interests, shared
and comcom
patible values into a balanced
patible
balanced and capable
Euro-Aclantic
community of
Euro-Atlantic community
of complemencomplemen
tary action.
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The strategic vision improvised by Harr
Harryy
Truman
Truman after
after 1945 was neither
neither AmeriAmeri
can nor European.
European. It was a Western
Western stratstrat
egy for a new transatl
antic order in which
transatlantic
America's
America’s European
European identity
identity was reset and
Europe's
recast , with defeat
Europe’s geography
geography recast,
defeated
ed
Germany in and Soviet Russia out. Thirty
Germany
Thirty
years after these goals were met during
during the
Reagan-Bush three-term
three-term co-presidenc
co-presidency,
y, no
new vision is needed. But the goals need
to be adapted-keep
adapted— keep the United
United States in,
move the EU
eu up, and inch Russia closer.
closer. As
Truman, America's
was the case with Truman,
America’s allialli
ance policy does not end in Europe-but
Europe— but it
does begin there.
there.
On both sides of the Atlantic, the stratestrate
gic road map for the 2020s demands more
from the
EU and its members,
th e eu
members, and more
from nato
NATO and its members
members,, including
includi ng the
United
United States.
States. A new balance between and
within
within both institutions
institutions is imper
imperative,
ative, but

1
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neith
er can be nor ever become sufficient
neither
because
because both are necessary for the “smart”
"smart"
use of their
their m
members
complementar
em bers’' com
plem entaryy
Europe , a mere return to its pe
power. For Europe,
perennial institutional
institutional debates will not move
the partnership
partnership beyond America’
America'ss “me,
"me, Tarzan"
dialoguing with "you
Jan e." Unless
zan” dialoguing
“you,, Jane.”
the capability
capability gaps across
acro~s the Atlantic
Atlantic are
redu
ced, defense cooperation
cooper ation will become
reduced,
increasingly difficult, and the security part
partner
ship will cease to be operational
operationa l and,
nership
and ,
therefore, relevant.
faitit quoi,"
then-French president
“"Qui
Qui fa
quoi,” then-French
president
Jacques Chirac
Chira c used to
to ask. To help address
question , a new transatlantic
transatlantic agenda
this question,
lon g overdue
overdue to account
is long
account for the com
comprehensive changes of the past twenty-five
years. To assume a role commensurate
commensurate with
its interests and capabilities, the eu
EU and its
members
should be prepared
prepared to
members should
to lead on
issues which they are especially well-suited

Image: A
A general
hemicycle during a plenary
plenary session
session ooff the
the European
Image:
general view shows
shows the hemicycle
European Parliament in Brussels,
Brussels, Belgium.
Belgium.
Reuters/FrancoisLenoir.
Lenoir.
Reuters!Francois
A Parmership
Partnership A
Att Risk
Risk

March/April2020
Mareh/April
2020 25

'

years: while the latter is
Brexit years:
historically and geographically
geographically.. Trump and Brexit
to address historically
EU,
, the
costs of exiting the eu
Bue still exposing the costs
Admittedly, much can happen
happen in 2020. But
former
has
shown
the
added
pains
of
living
with
increasingly
showing an increasingly
with each crisis showing
allies.
without allies.
short
EU leadership without
case for more eu
short fuse, the case
absent
doubt: absent
T
here should
should be no doubt:
There
grows stronger. For a new beginning
beginning with
geographical
weaker-geographicalEU is weaker—
Britain, the eu
administra Britain,
alongside the new U.S. administraIran, alongside
crippled, and
putated, historically
historically crippled,
amputated,
tion, but also for new diplomatic
diplomatic openings ly am
also
reverse is also
with countries
countries whose regimes gambled on politically betrayed. But the reverse
bickjust wait and watch. End the bick
true-just
Trump
Trump and will find it necessary to adjust true—
EU and a few of its
therefore: the eu
accordingly. In Eastern Europe, a geopolitigeopoliti ering, therefore:
members
are
powers
in
the world, just like
country faced with a
Russia, a country
cal reset with Russia,
Britain
remain even after its
Britain is and will remain
sputtering
economy and a weary leadership,
sputtering economy
capabilities, and
bulk, capabilities,
lacking bulk,
making it ripe for a liquidation
liquidation of its costly exit. But lacking
without
will, none can be a world power without
Ukrainesecurity
including Ukraine—
portfolio-including
security portfolio—
countries
the
others—
European
countries
in
need
others-European
and, eventually, a smaller, post-Putin
post-Putin grand
of their
Union
Union , the Union
their Union,
bargain with the Trump-less
Foreign
Britain
Britain, Britain
andd security in need of Britain,
Foreign an
West. And a reset too with
nion, and
Union,
need of a U
country with policy begins
China,
another country
China, another
home, in need
policy begi-nsaatt home,
the
U
nited
States
in need
United
an econom
y
struggling
to
economy struggling
an
d
the
United
United
both
and
of both as its most willing,
keep pace, but
but also increasincreas
ingly aware of a security enen States an
alcompatible al
andd Europe need capable, and compatible
lies.
count on any one,
Don 't count
lies. Don’t
.
.
vironm
ent that
arguably
that is arguably
vironment
u t their respective two,
Eu
cwo, or three post-Brexit eu
to pput
clan- to
the world’s
world's second most danpowers
to
compensate
for
gerous.
order. Forget powers to compensate
houses in order.
houses
And third,
Brit rr.
third, post-Brexit, BritBritain .
loss of Britain.
. h the loss
dB
1Trump and Brexit—
the
into the
settles into
As the dust settles
rextt-t. thee As
ain will remain a vital eu
part- rump an
EUpart
important
thirty 2020s, it will be important
ner. And however the Brexit trends ofthe
a st thirty
of the ppast
for both sides of the Chan
Chanreset of
transition evolves,
evolves, the reset
years have not been
nel
to
agree
on
the
terms
of
agree
strategically
is strategically
eu
-uk relations
relations is
EU-UK
good
on
either
side
o
f
of
their mutual interdependence
essential
transat- good
balanced transat
essential to a balanced
in ways
satisfy both
also satisfy
ways that also
lantic partnership.
partnership.
the Atlantic.
Atlantic.
sides
sides of the Atlantic. The sad
Foreign and security policy
is only one thing the United
is that there is
States fact is
United States
begins at home,
home , and both the United
States
Kingdom alone can do for the United States
their respective
put their
Europe need to put
and Europe
EU,
better and faster
, and that is to
faster than the eu
Brexit—
houses in order. Forget Trump and Brexit"Yes" when asked by Washington, with
years have not say “Yes”
the trends of the past thirty years
lost."
"Get lost.”
except “Get
little
comparable
comparable in return except
been good on either
side
of
the
Atlantic.
Atlantic.
either
Post-Brexit,
Call
it
Britain’
s
Mexican
option.
Post-Brexit,
Mexican
Britain's
There has been too much politics and not
links with
enough policy in the national capitals, but direct institutional and operational links
EU across the board should grant the
ef- the eu
enough ef
also too much
much policy and not enough
influence
presence and an influence
Likewise, United Kingdom a presence
ficiency out
institutions. Likewise,
out of the institutions.
compatible
with
its
ability
to
contribute
to
contribute
ambition and not
there has been too much ambition
member,
the eu
’s ability to act—no
act-no longer a member,
Eu's
down,
enough
conviction from the top down,
enough conviction
whose
to be sure,
sure, but a non-member member whose
but too much resentment
resentment and not enough
sigobligations continue to be sig
privileges and obligations
time from the bottom
Yet, there is an privileges
bottom up. Yet,
nificant
and
potentially
indispensable.
indispensable.
internal
turbulence of the
upside to the turbulence
internal upside
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hile political
theory and elecpolitical theory
elec
arithmetic point
point to a likely
toral arithmetic
defeat of
incumbent presiof the incumbent
presi
2020 , recent history and
dent in November
November 2020,
point to forecasts chat
electoral geography
geography point
that
failed to account
for
Trump's
account
Trump’s uncann
uncannyy abilabil
2016ity to defeat the odds as he did in 2016—
che “what
"what if”
if " that
that was broadly
broadl y overlooked
the
during
presidential elections
during the past four presidential
in the United
United States, as well as for the June
2016 referendum
referendum in the United
United Kingdom.
Kingdom.
It is during
during their
their second term in office
chat U.S. presidents find their way into histhat
his
(Harry Truman,
tory, for the better
better (Harry
Truman, Ronald
Reagan, and George
George W. Bush) or for the
worse (Dwight
(Dwight Eisenhower, Lyndon
Lyndon JohnJohn
son, and Bill Clinton).
Obama was a
Clinton). Barack Obama
special case:
case: his election alone made history,
for which he was awarded
awarded a Nobel
Nobel Peace
Prize which should have gone to the AmeriAmeri
one-term president
can Union.
Union. As to one-term
presidentss like
Jimm y Career
Jimmy
Carter and George H.W.
H.W Bush, they
have been cast primarily as caretakers—
caretakers-thethe
latter for giving Reagan a virtual third term,
and the former
former for giving his country
country the
timeout it needed after Nixon.
timeout
Don
chat much
Don’t't expect that
much from a second
second
Trump term. As the former
Trump
former uk
ambassador
UK ambassador
Sir Kim Darroch
Darroch seated
stated upon
upon leaving his
post in Washington,
Washington, the U.S. president
president will
not
not "become
“become substantially
substantially more
more normal,
normal,
unpredictable , less
less dysfunctional
dysfunctional,, less unpredictable,
faction riven
faction
riven,, less diplomatically
diplomatically clumsy
clumsy
and
ch his 2016
2016 electoral
and inept.
inept.”" Wi
W ith
electoral tri
triumph confirmed
confirmed in 2020 after a scorchedumph
earth political
earth
political battle
battle over impeachment,
impeachment,
Trump
would be fully unleashed—
Trump would
more
unleashed-more
personal
personal and confrontational,
confrontational, more
more unpreunpre
dictable
dictable and unreliable
unreliable,, angrier
angrier and more
would also be more unvengeful. But he would
un
filtered and insulated
insulated and, therefore, more
impulsive and freer of any constraints.
constraints. He
will stand
stand permanently
permanently at the edge of a
constitutional confrontation
confrontation but
constitutional
but comfortcomfort
obedient Republican
ed by an obedient
Republican Party (likely
to be still in control
control of at least the Senate)
to
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and
"his " Supreme
and protected
protected by “his”
Supreme Court,
Court,
to gain as man
poised to
manyy as two more con
conservative Justices.
These
thoughts are not
These thoughts
not reassuring.
reassuring. In
2016,
Americans
did
not gee
2016,
get the president
president
the y hoped
hoped for and
deserved: too much
they
and deserved:
much
controversy
surrounded his election. Yet the
controversy surrounded
world may have gotten
gotten what
deserved ,
world
what it deserved,
including the adversaries who cheated too
including
much
much and even the allies who are said to
do too little. With
W ith a Trump
Trump reelection
reelection in
2020,
2020, however, the roles would be reversed:
reversed:
mandate
Americans who vote for a second mandate
would get the president
president they want
want and thus
deserve. But Europe
Europe and even the world
world
would receive
receive more than they can possibly
would
manage , including
including a populi
st brand
manage,
populist
brand name
promoted at the
which will be aggressively
aggressively promoted
expense of national
national leaders the U.S. presipresi
dent
dent might
might not
not like, not to mention
mention a more
confrontational
approach with
confrontational approach
with states and
governments that
economic
governments
that denied him the economic
and
nuclear deals he had hoped
and nuclear
hoped to con
conclude during
during his first term. Thus,
Thus, moving
moving
hypothetically
hypothetically into
into Trump's
Trump’s second
second presi
presidential term, there are a few priorities to be
adopted in such a scenario.
adopted
First, let Europe
Europe be Europe:
Europe: as an ever
closer and stronger Union
Union whose members
member s
think
think,, speak, and act European.
There
There is more to the making
Europe
making of Europe
than the United
United States, and other
U.S.. pres
other U.S
presidents have questioned
questioned the idea of a united
united
Europe,
Europe, although
point of de
although not to the point
declaring the EU
foe" and NATO
"obsolete"
eu "a
“a foe”
NATO “obsolete”
and “brain
"brain dead.”
dead." A second four-year term
Trump would be extremely consequen
for Trump
consequential for the military
military alliance, and everyone
should plan accordingly.
accordingly.
Less NATO
nato calls for more
more EU
e u , not
not as a
matter
but as a matter
m
atter of choice
choice but
m atter of ne
nenot a new condition,
cessity. This
This is not
condition, as
has been seen often
often since the 1956 Suez
Crisis shaped the ratification
ratification debates of the
Rome Treaties. To each transatlantic
transatlantic crisis
relance and
its relance
and for each relance
relance its crisis.

March/April
M arch/April 22020
020

27
27

presiTrump's second presi
W
ithout a doubt,
doubt , Trump’s
Without
Admittedly,
ambivalence
enough ambivalence
there is enough
y, there
Admittedl
would
dential
would be stressful. It would
to end
dential term would
EU institution
and confusion
institutionss to
about eu
confusion about
capaciAmerica 's capaci
test Europe’s
Europe's will and America’s
continent, across
th e continent,
this pattern—
patt ern- across the
relaty
to
salvage
whatever
it
can
of
the
rela
whatever
to
But
Atlantic.
e
th
the channel,
channel, and across the Atlantic.
anti-Eu
tionship.
divisive anti-EU
Intent on his divisive
tionship. Intent
post-Trump,
post-Brexit,
clo sing on
and closing
exit, and
post-Trump, post-Br
deceppromote the decep
would promote
Trump would
post-Putin
not post-Russia),
post-Ru ssia), there is strategy, Trump
(but not
po st-Putin (but
relations
trade relations
tive
privileged trade
benefits of privileged
rive benefits
an opportunity
members and the
EU members
opportunity for eu
with other
exiters-to-be in Eastern and
EU exiters-to-be
ocher eu
skepti cs to come
growing
Euroskeptics
peloton of Euro
growing peloton
congresSouthern
seeking congres
while seeking
Europe while
Southern Europe
to their senses.
senses. For while the idea of Europe
posagreement pos
approval of a trade agreement
efficacy, sional approval
has lost much
mu ch of its past clarity and efficacy,
shortly
re- sibly signed with Britain prior to or shortly
has re
it has lost none of its relevance and has
would remain
after his
re-election . Tariffs would
his re-election.
gained mu
much
urgency. For those who
ch of its urgency.
adversaraimed at adversar
a weapon
choice , aimed
weapon ooff choice,
confirm s that
have failed to notice,
notic e, Brexit confirms
conmore con
with more
alike , and with
there is no credible plan B, for the states of ies and allies alike,
global
intra-European and global
sequen ces on intra-European
Europee relative to the
Union, but also for sequences
th e Union,
Europ
trade patterns—
threatening
patterns-threatening
the United
Scates relative to
United States
"de-integration"
dangerous “de-integration”
As Europe struggles
struggles to a dangerous
its alliance.
alliance.
economy.
world's
the
of
also
must
it
Europe,
be
scrugEurope
as
Second,
Second,
Europe strug- ^
also
W° rld’S eC°
n0my' Aninterest in
ticipate , too, an interest
gles to be Europe,
Europe, it must
r
ticipate,
must
NATOby a
phase-out from NATO
Trump leam
learn how to let Trump a phase-out
co let Trump
also learn how to
to
want t0
would want.
Trump w0^ld
andd America date TrumP
Trump
be be J
America be
Trump, and America
be Trump,
r u m p > an
make
meaning
of-meaning
certain of—
make certain
. .
:
America.
limited liability
liabilit y
Americ a. A limited
ited no later than
2024 for the
than 2024
limited
in- be America. A lim
ill in
do-st still
partnership can do—
partnership
end
of
his
mandate
and the
tent on U.S.-EU
cooperation
mandate
partnership
liability
cooperation
U.S.-Eu
liability partnership
seventy-fifth
anniversary
of
anniversary
seventy-fifth
and eu
nato
complementar
EU-NATOcomplementarcan
do—
still
intent
on
intent
do-still
the
1949
Washington
Treaty.
Treacy.
Washington
ity.
icy.
Over the past three
U.S.-EU
decades U
thr ee decades
.S .-E U cooperation By that time he would have
completed
more specifically,
Bill
Clinton
long-awaited
completed his long-awaited
EU-NATO
andd EU-NATO
Bill
specifically,
an
bilateral entente
Putin 's
entente with Putin’s
neglected the defeated state,
state,
neglected
Russia
back
into
a
reconsti
reconscicomplementarity.
forche for
Russia, and most of the
tuted
compens ation ,
Ass compensation,
tuted G8. A
mer Soviet Republics;
Republi cs; George
NATO
hors NATO
closer bilateral security relations hors
9/ 11, in
W.
che wars of 9/11,
mismana ged the
W Bush mismanaged
Eumight
countries in Eu
might be offered to some countries
Obama
Afghanistan
Iraq ; and Barack Obama
Afghani stan and Iraq;
rope,
in
but
also
hors
e
u
.
In
short,
a
new
short,
EU.
hors
conmisunderstood
the
and
its
con
Spring
Arab
misunder stood
would begin
Europe would
sequences
geopolitical map for Europe
predeces- geopolitical
impro ving his predeces
without improving
sequ ences without
remembered of
sors’
unfini sh ed business. As a result, it is to emerge, closer to what is remembered
sors' unfinished
compathardl y compat
centur y but hardly
nineteenth century
h ave the nineteenth
not
European
ean states have
chat Europ
surpri sing that
not surprising
with
what
had
been
expected
for the
expected
what
ible
taken
to
questioning
American
leadership
American
questioning
caken
twenty-first—
sanctions-driven
rather
than
twenty-first-sanctions-driven
with renewed intensity. But still, there is one
clarity, and with
ver- rules-based, lacking moral clarity,
conclusion at least
history's ver
abo ut which history’s
lease about
little strategic consistency.
e, and the world
dict
Europe,
diet is final: America, Europ
And yet...
there is
patience-there
patience, patience—
yet ... patience,
are better
bett er off when America stays in (1945)
more
to
America
than
Trump
and
less
less to
Trump
America
than when it stays
stays away (1914, 1939), steps
Trump than America. There
There would remain
Whatdown (1919) or stands aside (1991). What
second
cooperation in a second
much room for cooperation
pres- much
ever the outcome
outcome of the next American pres
Trump
issues of shared interest to
Trump term on issues
hold .
idential
chis verdict will still hold.
idencial election, this
Novo-Ogaryovo
the Novo-Ogaryovo
Councilat the
Image:
Russian
president Vladimir
SecurityCouncil
the Security
membersooff the
with members
chairs aa meeting with
Putin chairs
Vladimir Putin
an president
Image:Russi
state
ikhail Klimentyev!Kremlin.
Klimentyev/Kremlin.
Sputnik/Mikhail
Russia.Sputnik/M
Moscow,Russia.
outsideMoscow,
residence outside
state residence
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EU and nato
NATO countries—
countries-even
the eu
even when
interests are not evenly shared and
these interests
responsibility for those interests not evenly
institutions and all
assumed by both institutions
all of their
members.
Third
don't let Russia be Russia, and
Third,, don’t
Putin , Putin: an integrated
integrated Ostpolitik
Putin,
Ostpolitik that
involves
EU,, and their thirty-five
involves NATO,
nato, the eu
members is needed.
This is not about Putin because of Rus
Russia with and in spite of Trump, but about
Russia with and in spite of Putin. Always
Always
a rival,
rival, this complex but also complexed
complexed
resists the idea of having just foreign
power resists
vicinity-they
countries in its vicinity—
they can only be
vassals or enemies. Strategic prudence
either vassals
is how the Cold War was won, with quite
compromises along the way.
a few compromises
ith
way. W
With
Europe still the strategic centerpiece of its
envies, more prudence—
imperial envies,
meaning
prudence-meaning
also more patience—
patience-is is needed.
also
Looking already beyond
beyond the end of his
Looking
current m
mandate
2024, Putin
Putin is not
current
andate in 2024,
not

merely an opportunist
opportunist and an improvis
improviser: he is also a strategist
strategist and a survivor.
He chooses his time to pick his fights, but
prepared to fight the
when he does he is prepared
time-tested Russian way: hard,
hard , long, and
time-tested
dirty. Don
't
wait
for
him,
therefore, to
Don’t wait
him, therefore,
ro
without trying to preserve or
change course without
add to previous gains. In Eastern Europe,
including Ukraine,
Ukraine , but also
also in regions less
including
less
known to Russia like the Middle East, Putin
manipulates facts and fiction—
fiction-weapons
manipulates
weapons
cannot spend,
he does not have, money he cannot
allies he cannot
cannot get, or time he is lacking.
allies
But better than most, Putin can separate the
creates from the facts
facts he knows,
fiction he creates
which keeps him open to negotiations after
resolve-don
he has shown his resolve—
don’t't indulge
indulge
don't provoke but do engage.
engage. For in the
and don’t
history tells
tells us that Russia’s
end, history
Russia's attempts
attempts
to
go
to
global neither last long nor end well,
well,
and as an exhausted post-Soviet Russia runs
people , capabilities,
capabilities , and
out of resources, people,
space, it will run out of time.
even security space,

relacapabilities and technological advances rela
rhe West will come
co the
At this
turning to
point, turning
chis point,
Ar
doubtful
Scares
tive
to
the
United
States
are
doubtful
and
United
rhe
co
Gorbachev 's strategic
naturally—
hoes of Gorbachev’s
naturall y-ecechoes
echoes
rime-echoes
confirmation over time—
co in need of confirmation
attempt to
dead end after Brezhnev’s
Brezhnev's final attempt
ecoof the misleading projections
projections of Soviet eco
challenge the United
primacy in
Scares for primacy
United States
emerging
nomic
nomic growth in the 1950s and emerging
Europe and for influence in the world.
strategic superiority
superiority in the 1970s. At issue
strateFourth,
China a pass, a strate
don't give China
Fourth, don’t
China to shared primacy
is not the rise of China
gic reset is needed.
but a reminder
reminder of the obstacles along the
transformation
quick transformation
Expectations of a quick
Expectations
way.
China is a power in the world
shore, China
way. In short,
of a prosperous
constructive
China into a constructive
prosperous China
but it is not yet a world power; and even as
partner
partner were exaggerated. Feared in Europe,
Asia's
the foremost power in Asia, it is not Asia’s
anticipated a U.S. pivot
which has forever anticipated
partner
While the behavior of a
partner of choice. While
economic
to
experience of economic
chis early experience
co Asia, this
increaspredicted , increas
rising power cannot
cannot be predicted,
Scares and
collusion
United States
between the United
collusion between
China will
ingly tumultuous
tumultuous relations with China
China
China now comes with fears of a collision
be handled
United States and
nor an
handled best if the United
then, is not
between
chem. At issue, then,
between them.
though
Europe
act
jointly
as
powers
in Asia, though
jointly
militar y reset with
overdue
economic and military
overdue economic
not Asian powers.
imunilateral and im
China,
whether the unilateral
bur whether
China, but
threatento-date are threaten
provised methods
methods used to-date
e are left with a few
ing to
w
all.
quagmire for all.
co open a quagmire
about
assumptions
Hegemonic
assum
ptions about
not
upgrades
Idegemonic
upgrades
do
not
Hegemonic
an incom
plete and
come
just ask Imperial
incomplete
not
do not
Imperial upgrades
easily-just
come easily—
upgrades do
straEurope, still the stra
unfinished
unfinished Europe,
Germany
about their
Japan about
Germany and Japan
revanchist Ruspriority of a revanchist
regic priority
easily-— tegic
come easily
own bids for power in 1919 and come
unbalanced Asia, where
Imperial sia; in an unbalanced
1941,
st ask Imperial
just
1941 , and check with Soviet Rus- ju
stands as
sia in 1991 too.
Tim
ing
is
ev^
,
an
ascending
hina stands
China
ascending C
d
G,
too. Timing
erything,
but
don’t
overlook
the
ermany
an
^
most
serjous
new
bidder
for
bidder
serious
the
don 't overlook th e
eryrhing,
need for sustainable
Japan.
global hegemony;
hegemony ; and in the pivcapabilities
sustainable capabilities
Middle East, where
and competence.
United
otal
oral Greater Middle
competence. Take the United
ambitions of
States of America: what made its rise to
Iran serves the ambitions
th e rise of Iran
co he- the
traditioneager
newcomers
like
Russia
and
tradition
newcomers
gemony
gemony especially effective is that its leaders
took their time while building
bystanders like Saudi Arabia. This is not
re- al bystanders
building up their re
an agenda imposed
Trump on America,
imposed by Trump
sources and gaining experience.
Europe, and by the West ·on
Whether China
during the by America on Europe,
China will do as well during
Whether
the world, but one imposed
imposed by the world
coming
Indeed,
coming decade is, at best, unclear. Indeed,
all.
both its capabilities and competence
competence may be on all.
First, the transatlantic
partnership is and
transatlantic partnership
exaggerated. Consider
economic miracle:
Consider its economic
will remain vital for any sort
sore of rules-based
Uniaccording to researchers at the
rhe Chinese Uni
Yes,
order
to
emerge
over
the
next decade. Yes,
versity of Hong
Hong Kong and the University of
leadership has been fading preChicago, annual
America 's leadership
annual growth has been overstated America’s
United
post-Trump. But even so, the United
by an average of 1.7 percentage
points for and post-Trump.
percentage points
partStates and Europe
indispensable part
Europe are indispensable
leaving
at least nine
(2008-2016), leaving
nine years (2008-2016),
ners
which
remain
united
by
the
interests
united
the nominal
size
of
the
economy
at
about
about
economy
nominal
and values they share with each other more
eighteen
official
than its official
lower than
percent lower
eighteen percent
evenly than with others. Alternatives—
like
Alternatives-like
level
rhe end of 2018.
trillion at the
$13.4 trillion
level of $13.4
democratic
a so-called
"Anglosphere " of democratic
so-called “Anglosphere”
Other
Other statistical claims of strategic parity or
"Europe"
states,
European “Europe”
stares, or an allegedly European
even superiority
China's military
superiority extend to China’s
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stretching
stretching from the Atlantic to
to the Urals, or
a geostrategic pivot to a Pacific pas de quatre
qrntre
choreographed
choreographed by the United
United Scates
States with
Australia, Japan, and India-lack
India— lack the comcom
patibilities
es of the
patibilities and complementariti
complementarities
Euro-Atlantic
Euro-Atlantic co-partner
co-partnership.
ship.
Second, the United
United States is preponderpreponder
ant in most
ant
most dimensions
dimensions of powerpower— the
world's
world’s most complete
complete power. For allies
allies and
adversaries
alike,
the
adversaries
facts of its power are
not
not questioned-onl
questioned— onlyy how it is employed
and why. However, for Europe to
ca
to be a capable
pable counterpart
counterpart with
with enough
enough capacity
cap acit y
to act, even as a count
erweight, its Un
counterweight,
Union
ion
needs to be extended
extended in the political arena
lest it proves to
to be no better than a counter
counterfeit. NATO
nato cannot
cannot be turned
turned into a universal
social worker any more
more than the eu
be
EU can become a global security provider. With
With each
institution
institution relying on the other
other in the areas
it does least or less well, institutional
institutional comcom
plementarity
plementarity is about
about power and weaknessweakness
Europe thus compl
es, as America
America and Europe
complete
ete
each ocher
other on behalf
behalf of shared interests and
common
goals.
common goals.

Third,
complementarit
T hird, com
plem entarityy ooff E
urope
European membership
members hip in NATO
nato and the EU
eu also
remains
The six countries
countries that
remains desirable. The
chat
signed
the
Rome
Treat
ies
signed
Rome Treaties were all nato
NATO
members; thirty-five years later,
later, at the end
of the Cold War, the European
European member
membership of NATO
nato (then fifteen) and the EU
eu (then
identic al. Enl
twelve) was nearly identical.
Enlargement
argement
since then has affected
affected both institutions
institutions
almost evenly, with only two of the thirteen
new nato
NATO members and five of the sixteen
new eu
EU members not becoming
becoming members
member s
of the other institution.
institution . Post-Brexit but also
also
with reference to
to Turkey, this
chis convergence
now looks beyond
beyond reach. To avoid more
mo re
separation,
separation, consultation
consultation between the total
thirty-five members
members of eu
EU (now twentythirty-five
twent yeight) and nato
NiITO (now twenty-nine, includ
including twenty-one European countries) should
!be
ease Euro-Atlantic consul
be reinforced to ease
consultation
before
dedsions are made by or for
tation
decisions
either
institution, thus making
making them all
either institution,
partner s of choice for joint
partners
joint or complemen
complementary action by either
either institution
institution to which
they do not or cannot belong.

Image:
Image: The
The U.S.
U.S. flag lies
lies in front
fro n t ooff the Capitol
Capitol dome
dome in Washington,
Washington, DC.
DC. Reuters/Jo
Reuters/Joshua
Roberts
shua Rober
ts
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Fourth,
China as a superpower
Fourth , the rise of China
reis nearly certain, whatever its place in a re
nu five nu
gion with little settled history and five
clear powers—
including two of them that
powers-including
users.
potential first users.
are highly unstable and potential
Unlike the Soviet Union,
Union, which could not
supe's supe
match,
America’s
match, let alone surpass, America
although the road is
riority, China
China can, although
riority,
getting
bumpier and the risks of a hard
getting bumpier
growlanding
with falling growth,
growth, grow
real-with
landing real—
adapting regional
challenges, and little adapt
regional challenges,
ability.
ability. As was shown by Reagan after three
decades of global rivalry with the Soviet
Union,
Union, strategic restraint has its limits and
hegemonic
inishing
diminishing
expansion faces dim
hegemonic expansion
allegreturns. Seven
Seven decades after the West alleg
China which
China, it is now China
"lost" China,
edly “lost”
"losing" the West, as a broad consensus
is “losing”
less united
posits that a less
united
less strong and even less
all.
China
China may be a better fit after all.
Fifth, the Cold War is won and gone, but
defeated. For
neither done nor defeated.
Russia is neither
that
world that
Russian
the Russky
M
ir—
the
Russian
world
Russky Mir-the
comprises parts of Kazakhstan and sizeable
sizeable
populations
there is no
States-there
Baltic States—
populations in the Baltic
influmodest vision of a natural sphere of influ
ence over its neighbors. Now, only a short

I

quarter
century after its most recent
quarter of a century
War,
defeat, Russia acts like it won the Cold War,
disbanded and the
as it calls for nato
NATO to be disbanded
interveneu
EU to be neutered while blatantly interven
ing in their members’
memb ers' national elections and
areas of vital
spreading new instabilities in areas
geopointerest to them.
Yet, faced with bad geopo
them . Yet,
litical conditions
economica lly
around, economically
con ditions all around,
vulnerable,
vulnera ble, and with few capable friends,
future
Russia is a demandeur state whose future
is with but not in the West, including
including the
neither in
Europe , and neither
United
United States and Europe,
nor with Asia,
including China.
Asia, including
Sixth, the Greater
Middle East is more
Greater Middle
unprefragmented, hostile, dangerous, and unpre
arbefore. The territorial ar
dictable than ever
ever before.
Ottoexpense of the Otto
rangements made at the expense
man Empire one hundred
years ago are void
hundred years
and opened to the
th e highest bidders. Gone,
betoo, are the few
few days of interstate wars be
tween
its Arab neighbors to which
Israel and its
rween Israel
the region grew accustomed—
accustomed-thethe kind of
wars
cheap, America
Israel could win on the cheap,
wars Israel
end on the quick, and Europe watch from
a distance
non-Western states were
distance while non-Western
endkept away.
What is left are the kinds of end
away. What
win-with
less
less wars we lose or just cannot win—with

a potential
potential for bigger and worse wars than
any in the past. During
During the Cold War, the
statistic
that best described
described the deepening
statistic that
deepening
involvement in the Middle
U.S. involvement
Middle East was
zero-zero
zero—zero military casualties up to 1983 (in
Beirut, Lebanon) and zero regime change in
intervention after 1953 (in Iran), but also zero
tervention
effectiveness
effectiveness in ending the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and zero results in enhancing
enhancing human
human
rights.
Now,
even
rights.
Yogi Berra's
Berra’s arithmetic
arithmetic
cannot
cannot measure the current
current moral and stratestrate
gic confusion. With
With the region broken into a
multitude
multitude of territorial and sectarian pieces,
pieces,
and absent a local will to fix it or even agree
over what needs fixing first, there is little the
United
Scates and Europe can fix alone and
United States
on the quick, if anything.
Seventh, the entire
entire Greater
Greater Middle
Middle East
stands where Europe
stands
Europe was during
during the past
century: there can be no order in the world
without
without some order
order in the region. Turkey,
which "lost"
“lost” the region to an imperial West
in 1916, and the imperious
imperious rise of Iran
Iran,,
which hopes to regain the region on behalf of
its own brand of Islam, are special
special challenges
challenges
which neither the United
United States nor Europe
can escape.
escape. For the former, the West is losing
its appeal, and even while Turkey remains
fie for nato
NATO because of its military capabili
fit
capabilities, NATO
nato itself is not because of the alliance
handicaps it brings. And even if the EU
eu suits
Turkey because of the economic advantages it
offers, Turkey does not because of its demo
democratic deficits. Don't
Don’t make of Turkey an oror
phan, though: nato
NATO must give it the strategic
deserves for its contributions
contributions and
respect it deserves
the EU
eu the economic partner
partner it needs for its
secular democracy to endure.
Eight, wi
ch regard to Iran, the post-1979
with
post-1979
tensions are just about
about to run out of time.
As an increasingly
increasingly defiant
defiant regime shows a
predilection
predilection for war with the United
United States
economic pressures
over the "maximum"
“maximum” economic
pressures
imposed since Trump
withdrew from
imposed
Trump withdrew
from the
Israel-and
2015 nuclear deal; and as Israel—
and possi
possibly the United
United Scates
States too-confirms
too— confirms its own

preference for a war with
with Iran over a nuclear
Iran,
chis is the most
Iran, this
most immediate
immediate threat
threat in
region, with
the region,
with a potential
potential for a serious
military clash matched
military
matched nowhere
nowhere else.
else. Make
no mistake:
whenever a war
mistake: however
however and whenever
starts with Iran
Iran,, unless it is ended
ended quickly,
the horrific
horrific risk is to have it end into a cata
catastrophic
strophic nuclear escalation.
Ninth,
Ninth, wild cards and small events, by defdef
inition unknown
unknown and unpredictable,
inition
unpredictable, demon
demonstrate best the need for transatlantic
transatlantic strategic
interdependence.
interdependence. There
There are numerous
numerous presspress
ing concerns: terrorism,
terrorism , economic instability,
populist
populist uprisings, rapidly developing tech
technological changes, and more. With
With all these
issues moving at variable speeds and in opissues
op
posite directions,
directions, no power alone, however
peerless, can stay on top for long without
without
capable allies. And no single dimension
dimension of
power, however superior, can suffice to rere
solve any one issue, however significant.
Tenth,
Tenth, in a moment
moment infused with a cercer
destiny, divisions
tain air of destiny,
divisions between
between the
United
United States and Europe
Europe,, as well as among
among
the states
states of
of Europe,
Europe, are serious
serious because
because
many of these issues are existential.
many
existential. These
divisions are placing
transaclantic partplacing the transatlantic
part
nership in jeopardy
jeopardy at a time when unity
unity is
essential-notnot because, absent their alliance,
essential—
the United
United States and Europe
Europe would
would be dede
nied a future,
future, but because that
that future
future would
be less promising,
promising, more dangerous,
dangerous , and less
less
comfortable.
comfortable. Post-Trump
Post-Trump and post-Brexit,
post-Brexit,
then, lee's
let’s be sure to undo
undo the damage done
a t o . As
A s Winston
Winston Churchill
to the eEUu and nNATO.
Churchill
reflected in 1919, many
many futures ago, "The
“The
true nature
nature of nations
nations is what
what they do when
they are tired."
Western democracies
tired.” Our
O ur Western
democracies
have rarely been as tired
tired as they are now.
But whatever
whatever their reasons, this is no time
for them
them to
to walk away from the achieve
achievements
ments of the past seventy years, including
including
a Western
chat defeated history
Western alliance that
history in
Europe
Europe and kept
kept the West firmly in place
won't require thaumaturgy
elsewhere. It won’t
thaumaturgy to
revive it, but
but practical accomplishments.
accomplishments. D
□

Image:
military aircraftfly
Image: People
People hold their mobile phones aand
n d Chineseflags as military
ation during
fly in form
formation
during the military
parade marking the seventiethfounding
founding anniversary ooff Peoples
People'sRepublic ooff China. Reuters/Tingshu Wang.
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